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STATE OF UTAH 
JOHX POTTER .. DAVID B. POT-
TER J E X X IE I. POTTER, 
SARAH POTTER GIBBS, NgT-
TIE POTTER :MILES, MAY 
POTTER STE\YART, EDITH 
POTTER DEvVEY, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents. 
vs. 
DR. \Y. H. GROVES LATTER-
DAY SAIXTS HOSPITAL, 
a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
STATEMENT 
No. 6208 
The respondent, John Potter, is the surviving hus-
band of Jennie Bro-vvn Potter, deceased; the remaining 
respondents are the surviving children. As the sole heirs 
of deceased, they commenced the instant action to recover 
da·mages for the death of their wife and mother while a 
patient in the hospital operated by appellant. The jury 
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returned a verdict in favor of respondents, in the amount 
of $1,000.00; from the judgment entered on that verdict 
appellant appeals. 
After alleging deceased's admission into the hospi-
tal, and appellant's duty to exercise due care in the treat-
ment and nursing to which she was entitled, the complaint 
sets forth the acts of negligence on which respondents 
rely in the following language (paragraphs 6 and 7, 
Trans. 2-3; Abst. 3-4) : 
"6. That contrary to its duty as above set 
out, defendant, by its agents and servants, care-
lessly and negligently, as more particularly here-
inafter set out, allowed said Jean Brown Potter, 
deceased, to fall from bed and to suffer a broken 
hip as the result thereof, -vvhich fall and injury 
was the direct and proximate cause of the said 
Jean Bro'wn Potter's death; that said fall anrl in-
jury occurred on or about the 21st day of Feb-
ruary, 1939, and that death occurred on or about 
the 23rd day of February, 1939. 
"7. That the said Jean Brown Potter, de-
ceased, prior to said injury on said 21st day of 
February, 1939, and continuously after her en-
tering and admission into said hospital was nerv-
ous and at tirnes irrational, and due and reason-
able care required that the bed in which she was 
kept should be provided with sideboards to pre-
vent said Jean Brown Potter, deceased, from fall-
ing out of said bed; and plaintiffs allege that 
prior to said 21st day of February, 1939, said de-
fendant did so provide and maintain on said bed 
sideboards for the protection of said .Jean Brown 
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Potter. deceased, but that said defendant on the 
night of said :?1st day of February. 1939, did neg-
ligently and carelessly fail to provide for and place 
in position sideboards on said bed and negligently 
and carelessly failed to guard such bed and said 
Jean Brown Potter, deceased, so that by reason 
of said negligence and carelessness on the part of 
said defendant the said Jean Brown Potter, de-
ceased did on said 21st day of February, 1939, 
fall out of the bed in which she was kept by de-
fendant and as a result of said fall did suffer a 
broken hip and did as a result of said negligence 
and carelessness and said injury die on :the 23rd 
day of February. 1939. '' 
Answering the two paragraphs, appellant, in its 
amended ans,Yer (Trans. 18-19: Abst. 6-7), admitted that 
deceased sustained a fall and suffered injuries, and died 
on February :23, 1939. Each and all of the remaining al-
legations were denied. 
The affirmative defense of the amended ans·wer 
(paragraph 9-Trans. 19-22; Ahst. 8-12) alleges the rela-
tionship existing between the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-day Saints, the Price First Corporation of the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (the corpora-
tion exercising jurisdiction over the ''Ecclesiastical 
\Yard" of which deceased was a member), and appellant; 
the manner in which appellant's hospital is supported and 
maintained by the central church and the ecclesiastical 
wards; and the conditions on which deceased was ad-
mitted to the hospital as a patient. 
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For convenience, we quote the ·whole of paragraph 
9 of the affirmative answer, following each sub-paragraph 
thereof with the substance of respondents' (plaintiffs') 
admissions and denials, made in open court, as to all of 
the matters alleged in the paragraph : 
" (a) That at all times mentioned in said 
complaint, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
day Saints has been and now is an unincorporated 
association, engaged in operating and maintaining 
hospitals, and, in said hospitals, in caring for and 
treating, without compensation, the indigent sick 
and injured members of said Church, and also en-
gaged in promulgating and teaching generally the 
principles and tenets accepted and adopted by said 
Church; that in the carrying out of its purpose and 
object of operating and 'maintaining hospitals, the 
members and officers of said Church have caused 
corporations, similar to the defendant corpora-
tion, to be incorporated throughout the State of 
Utah and elsewhere, and that in the carrying out 
of its general purposes and objects, said members 
and officers have also caused other corporations 
sole, similar to the Price First Corporation of the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, to 
which reference is hereinafter made, to be incor-
porated throughout the State of Utah and else-
where, each of vvhich said other corporations exer-
cises local ecclesiastical jurisdiction over a given 
territory, commonly known and designated as an 
'Ecclesiastical \Vard.'" (Tran:;;. 19-20; Abst. 8-9.) 
(It was stipulated by plaintiffs that the alle-
gations of sub-paragraph (a) of paragraph 9 of 
defendant's amended -answer, 'lnight be deemed 
admitted, except for the allegation that the rare 
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· and treatment afforded hY tlw Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-day Sai.nts, in operating and 
maintaining hospitals, was ''without compensa-
tion.'' Such allegation, ''without compensation,'' 
under plaintiff's stipulation, was to be deemed de-
nied. Trans. 72-4; ..:-\bst. 12-13.) 
'• (b) That at all times mentioned in said com-
plaint the defendant has been and now is a cor-
poration, organized and existing under and by 
virtue of the laws of the State of Utah, and en-
gaged in operating and ·maintaining a general hos-
pital in Salt Lake City, Utah, and that during all 
of said time, the defendant has been and now is a 
non-profit and non-stock corporation owned wholly 
and solely by said Church as an institution and 
not through any stock ownership, and has been 
and now is operated and maintained, in part, by 
contributions, donations and payments made by 
said Church and by said other corporations sole 
exercising local jurisdiction, as aforesaid. That 
all of said contributions, donations and payments 
haYe been and now are derived from voluntary 
gifts made by the individual members of said 
Church.'' (Trans. 20; Abst. 9.) 
(It \Ya:;; also stipulated hy plaintiffs that the 
allegations of sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph 9 
of defendant's amended answer, might be deemed 
admitted. (Trans. 75; Ah~t. -13.) 
'' (c) That at all times mentioned in said com-
plaint, the Price First Corporation of the Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints has been and 
now is a corporation sole, organized and existing 
under and by virtue of the laws of the State of 
Utah, and exercising ecclesiastical jurisdiction 
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over what has been and nmv is knmYn as the 
'' Firs~t Ward of Price,'' and that during all of said 
time _said Price First Corporation has been and 
now is a non-profit and non-stock corporation, 
owned wholly and solely by said Church as an in-
strtution and not through any stock ownership, 
and among other things, has 'been and now is en-
gaged, with other similar corporations sole also 
exercising ecclesiastical jurisdiction in the vari-
ous localities throughout the State of Utah and 
elsewhere, in collecting voluntary offerings and 
gifts from the members of said Church residing 
in their respective localities, the proceeds of which 
said offerings and gifts, in part, have been and 
now are donated to the defendant corporation and 
used by it in meeting the expense incident to the 
care and hospitalization of the indigent sick and 
injured members of said 'Church in said localities; 
that in the event said offerings and gifts ,,·ere in-
sufficient to defray said expense, it has been and 
now is the practice and custom of said Church to 
pay, from its central and general fund, the amount 
of such deficiency, and that in the even said offer-
ings and gifts were in excess of the amount neces-
sary to defray said expense, it has been and now 
is the practice and custom of said Price First Cor-
poration, and said other corporations sole exercis-
ing sin1ilar jurisdiction, to pay the amount of said 
excess into the central and general fund of said 
Church. That in making said contributions, do-
nations and payments to the defendant corpora-
tion, said Church and said Price First Corpora-
tion, togetlwr with said other similar corporations 
sole, act only as conduits by and through which 
the voluntary offerings and gifts of the individual 
members of said Church are eon ,·oyed to the de-
fendant corporation." ('Trans. 20-21; .L\ h~t. 9-11.) 
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(It wa~ also stipulated by plaintiffs that the 
allegations of sub-paragraph (e) of paragraph 9 
of defendant's amended answer, might be deemed 
admitted, ""i.th the qualification that the Presiding 
Bishop of the 'Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
day Saints may call upon the Bishops of the local 
wards having patients hospitalized in the defend-
ant hospital, to contribute their pro rata share of 
the expenses incurred for said hospitalization; 
that when so called upon the local wards attempt 
to encourage their members to make sufficient 
donations for said purposes; and that the Presid-
ing Bishopric of said Church, in the event such 
funds are insufficient to cover the expenses of said 
hospital, meets said deficit by drawing on the gen-
eral funds ·of said Church. Trans. 75-83; Abst. 13.) 
" (d) That on and prior to February 16, 
1939, Jean Brown Potter, the deceased named in 
plaintiff's complaint, was an indigent person and 
a member of said First \Yard of Price; that on 
Februan, 16, 1939, said deceased, as a charity pa-
tient, and not otherwise, was admitted into the 
hospital maintained and operated by the defend-
ant corporation as aforesaid, and that thereupon 
said Price First Corporation, in furtherance of its 
practice and custo'm to assist in the maintenance 
of said hospital, assumed to and did contribute to 
the defendant corporation, from said voluntary 
offerings and gifts; that thereafter the defendant 
corporation, without compensation, rendered hos-
pital and medical services for said deceased to and 
including the date of her death, which occurred on 
February 23, 1939; that in performing said hos-
pital and medical services, without compensation 
as aforesaid, the defendant corporation acted as 
awl was a charitable institution and was exempt 
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from liability for the negligent acts of its em-
ployees, agents and servants, and that if said de-
ceased suffered injuries, resulting in her death, as 
alleged in said complaint, or at all, by reason of 
the negligent acts of any of its employees, agents 
or servants, which the defendant corporation de-
nies, the defendant corporation nevertheless is not 
liable for damages resulting from said alleged neg-
ligence and said death." (Trans. 21-23; Abst. 
11-12.) 
(As to the allegations of sub-paragraph (d) 
of paragraph 9 of defendant's amended ans"\ver, 
plaintiff also stipulated that when deceased en-
tered the defendant hospital there was no charge 
entered or made by the hospital to the deceased, 
or to any member of her immediate family; that no 
amount has ever been paid to the hospital for de-
ceased's care and n1aintenance, and that no 
amount has been paid by the Price First \V ard, 
which has been earmarked or designated to go to 
the hospital for deceased's care and maintenance. 
Trans. 84-88; Abst. 13-14.) 
At the outset of the trial, a stipulation relating to the 
testimony of Harold Barnes, Superintendent of the de-
fendant hospital, was also entered into. The stipulation 
is reflected in 'the abstract as follo·ws: 
(It was also stipulated by the parties that if 
Mr. Harold Barnes, superintendent of the defend-
ant hospital, ''Tere present, he would testify as fol-
lows: that it is the custom of the defendant hospi-
tal, when a patient is received in the hospital, to 
make a record of the entrance of that patient in the 
expense records of the hospital; that from day to 
day, as services are rendered, the customary 
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charge is 1nade and charged against the patient's 
record; that the amount of that charge is depend-
ent upon the amount and type of service and the 
room furnished; that at the end of the f'ervice the 
complete charge is Inade and that in the instant 
case the total charge n1ade against the deceased 
was $55.30; that since the date of deceased's death 
the defendant hospital has received a contribu-
tion from the Price First \Vard, of which Ward 
deceased ·was a member, of $10.00 only; that the 
hospital record, marked plaintiffs' Exhibit A, is 
the hospital record of deceased during the period 
of her hospitalization in the defendant hospital. 
Trans. 89-90; Abst. 14.) 
But one witness (Jennie I. Potter, a daughter 
-Trans. 95 ~\bst. 15) was called by respondents. She 
testified that her mother, ~Irs. Potter, suffering from a 
heart ailment ( arterio sclerosis), entered the hospital on 
the evening of Thursday, February 16, 1939, and was as-
signed to one of the wards; that no special nurse was en-
gaged the first night, but that a board, about twelve inches 
wide, was fastened with ropes to one side of the bed and 
that the other side \Vas against the \Vall; that she did not 
see the board in that position thereafter, but that she em-
ployed a special nurse for Friday, Saturday and Sunday 
nights; that on }[ onday one of the floor nurses expressed 
the opinion that ~Irs. Potter seemed to be doing so well, 
which fact was noticed by the witness, that they might 
well obviate the expense of a special nurse, and, being 
desirous of aYoiding that expense, the witness consented 
to the floor nurse releasing the special nurse. No special 
nurse \H1S in attendance :J[onday night. 
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Miss Potter also testified that she saw her mother 
daily and that she seemed quite nervous and at times 
became irrational. (Trans. 106-7; Abst. 17-18.) She 
was also permitted to give the substance of a conversation 
between Dr. Gill Richards and Dr. Llewellyn, occuring 
on February 22nd. The former stated to the latter doctor 
that one of Mrs. Potter's lungs was filled with pneumo-
nia, which was a direct result of her falling out of bed. 
Drs. Richards and Llewellyn were me,mbers of the hos-
pital staff, and Dr. Richards was assigned by the hospital 
to Mrs. Potter's case. 
The details of what occurred on 1Ionday night are 
found in the testimony of the night nurse furnished by 
the hospital, and 11:rs. Potter's chart made up by that· 
nurse: 
Leona Felix (Trans. 246; Abst. 54) went on duty at 
eleven o'clock P. JYL Monday and remained until seven 
o'clock A. :M. Tuesday. VVhen first seen, around twelYe 
o'clock midnight, l\1rs. Potter was sitting in bed at an 
angle of 45 or 60 degrees. In the same ward with her, 
Room No. 437, was another patient by the name of Mrs. 
Kearney, whom Miss Felix attended for some litHe time 
about midnight. l\frs. Potter was then awake; she seemed 
·very rational and ·was not at all restless. (Trans. 257; 
Abst. 265.) :Miss Felix left the two patients and went into 
the adjoining room, No. 436. Shortly thereafter, both 
patients began to talk very loud. l\Iiss Felix immediately 
returned to their room, where she saw :Mrs ... Potter, in a 
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:'itting posture on the bed, '"ith her legs an(l feet dangling 
over the edge. She appeared as if she were getting ready 
to get off the bed. 'Vhile ~Iiss Felix was trying to ge1t to 
her, :J[rs. Potter got off the bed and the nurse was only 
able partially to break the fall. At the instant nf rs. 
Potter fell, :J[rs. l(earney exclaimed, "I told her not to 
go to the bathroom. She said she was going to the bath-
room." In the fall from the 'bed, the patient sustained 
a fractured hip and died two days later, February 23. 
~Irs. Potter's hospital chart (Exhibt A), consisting 
of some 20 pages, contains the usual records made and 
kept by hospitals, including a detailed daily Clinical 
Record made by the attending nurses. The last page of 
the chart contains the record of death, and the nine pages, 
immediately preceding, constitute the Clinical Record. 
The period from 7 P. :JI. to 7 A. ~I. of each day is shown 
in red ink; the intervening period, in blue ink. 
From the first page of the Clinical Record, it will be 
noted that :JT rs. Potter was first assigned to Room 203 
at 8:30 P. :Jf. on February 16, 1939. At 10 P. M. there is 
a notation, "Side board on bed.'' Between February 16 
and Februar:, 21, there are notations of' 'labored respira-
tion;" '·mind more clear, and is more cooperative;" 
''sleeping soundly;'' ''complains of smothering sensa-
tion;'' and ''sleeping.'' As heretofore stated, no special 
nurse was in attendance on J\fonday night, February 20-
~1. At 12 :15 A. ~f., February 21, the notation reads 
'• awake-not restlc>s~. '' It was at this time that l\liss 
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Felix stated she -vvas in the room, attending Jf rs. l{earney. 
Following this notation, we find another made at 12:20 
A. M.: "Talking-pt. (patient) sitting on edge of bed 
with legs doVirn, reaching for the floor-fell as nurse 
entered the room. Complains of left hip paining-helped 
back to bed, crying and complaining of pain. Visited b)· 
Dr. Bourne-exam.-Side boards placed on one side bed." 
Neoma Mason, a graduate and experienced nurse, 
also testified for appellant. (Trans. 189; Abst. 37.) 
She was one of the two n1edical supervisors assigned to 
the ward in which Thfrs. Potter was hospitalized. She 
stated (Trans. 198; Abst. 40) that l\1:rs. Potter ·was first 
put in Room 203, Division 2-a ~ later, Sunday morning, 
she was transferred to Room 437, Division 4-'b. She was 
first seen by the ·witness on Friday morning; was very 
restless most of the tin1e. On ~¥fonday morning, when 
seen by Miss :Mason, :Mrs. Potter was more restful and 
seemed to enjoy the association with l\Irs. Kearney. Noth-
ing, the witness stated, either as a result of her observa-
tions or of conversations with the other nurses, indicated 
that sideboards ·were necessary for :Mrs. Potter. 
Rhoda Larson, also a graduate nurse (Trans. 222: 
Abst. 47), held a similar position to ~Iiss ~Iason. She 
saw Mrs. Potter daily, except possibly for one day; on 
Monday afternoon, comparing her observations then with 
those made on previous days, she noted a marked im-
provement in the mental condition of :Mrs. Potter. The 
latter was perfectly rational and v<:>ry \veil oriented, and 
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~eemed happy at being in the lw~pital. Side boards, the 
witness stated, were sometimes put on when patients 
seemed irrational and restless. "\Yhen such was not the 
ease, or when they were unconscious, boards were not 
used. The witness further stated that many patients re-
sented the use of sideboards, as they gave them a shut-in 
feeling and made them Inore restless. She expressed the 
opinion that in :Jlrs. Potter's case sideboards would not be 
necessary. 
The respondent, John Potter, was 77 years old; his 
deceased wife, 71 years old. The youngest of the remain-
ing ·respondents, the surviving children, was 32 years 
old. All of the children had been married and had lived 
separate and apart from their parents for many years, 
ranging from three (Jennie I. Potter) to 31 years (:Sarah 
Potter Gibbs). (Trans. 116-120; Abst. 22-23.) The par-
ents were not assisting, and for a long period of time had 
not assi::ded, any of the children. On the other hand, 
some of the c-hildren were in the habit of making small 
contributions to their parents, and those living at Price, 
Utah, the parental home, assisted their mother a't times 
with her house\York. The financial condition of the cou-
ple, and the extent of the contributions and assistance 
rendered by the children, are sho\vn in the testimony of 
.Jennie I. Potter. The abstract reflects the testimony as 
follows : (Trans. 130; Abst. 25) : 
''I have tried to help in supporting mother. 
She has been receiving a pension of $24.00 a month. 
I haven't been paying her any definite sum. When 
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she needed clothes, I bought them for her. Dur-
ing the past year I have not contributed very 
much; just presents and gifts; I haven't given any-
thing regularly. My father also got a pension of 
$17.00 a month. While they were at home they 
were always saving what they didn't need, and 
they used that money here in Salt Lake CitY. 
When they needed extra money I gave it to the~. 
My brother would also give them a gift when he 
thought they needed it My brother didn't con-
tribute very much. Sometirnes he would go up 
there and give them a dollar or two when he 
thought they needed a lit:Ue extra money. It 
wouldn't amount to very much each month. My sis-
ter, Sarah Potter Gibbs, did not contribute any-
thing. Neither did my sister, Nettie Potter :Miles, 
con1tribute to their support. vVhile my parents were 
in Price Mrs. 11:iles would help mother around the 
home. She would help her with her housework. 
~;[y sister, l\[ay Potter Ste·wart, contributed just 
about the san1e as my brother; just a few dollars. 
J\fy sister Edith Potter Dewey, \vho lived in Los 
Angeles, contributed very little. Mrs. Gibbs, my 
sister living in Price, would also help mother with 
the housework. During the past year practically 
all of us children have been contributing some lit-
tle money to the support and maintenance of our 
mother. In addition to that the children who were 
living in the S'ame community with mother would 
contribute their services in helping her with the 
housework.'' 
Respondents pleaded special damages in the total 
amount of $290.00 and offered evidence as to four items: 
Casket and other funeral expenses, $190.00; burial lot, 
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$33.00; \Yallaee ~[ortuary at Price, Utah, $15.00; and 
burial clothing, $20.00; a total $258.00. (Trans. 115 ; 
Abst. 21-22.) 
The mother was not strong, having suffered a heart 
attack as early as ~fay, 1938. (Abst. 24.) Together with 
her husband, John Potter, she came to Salt Lake City on 
October 15, 1938, and resided at the Little Hotel. The 
object in making the trip was to give :Mr. Potter the atten-
tion of a Salt Lake City doctor. On January 31, 1939 
(Trans. 128; Abst. 25), ~frs. Potter had a further heart 
attack and was thereafter confined to her bed at the Little 
Hotel until she was removed to the hospital on February 
16. Prior to this last illness, however, there was testi-
mony to the effect that she kept care of her husband's 
clothes and saw to it that he was fed and dressed. The 
couple went out for their meals. (Trans. 125; Abs;t. 24-25.) 
Dr. John Bourne, a licensed physician and surgeon, 
testified that he examined ~Irs. Potter upon her admit-
tance into the hospital, and saw her daily thereafter. Her 
condition was so serious, he stated, that he doubted very 
much that she would ever recover. (Trans 280; Ahst. 60.) 
ARGUMENT 
Appellant makes 22 assignments of error. (Abst. 
88-95.) 
Nos. I to XI, inclusive, are directed to the admission 
of certain evidence offered by plaintiffs (respondents) ; 
No. XII, to the denial of defendant's (appellant's) motion 
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for a non-suit, and No. XIII, to the denial of defendant's 
(appellant's motion for a directed verdict; Nos. XIV to 
XVI, inclusive, to instruction number 2 and to two sepa-
rate parts thereof; Nos. XVII 'to XIX, inclusive, to in-
struction number 9 and to two separate parts thereof; and 
Nos. XX to XXII, inclusive, to the Court's refusal to give 
defendant's requests Nos. 6, 13 and 20. 
ASSIGNMENr:rs NOS. I to V, Inclusive. 
These assignments are ·waived hy appellant. 
ASSIGN~IE~TS NOS. VI arHl VII 
These assignments had to do with questions pro-
pounded to the witness Jennie I. Potter, wherein she was 
asked .as to what the relationship was between her father 
and mother, so far as their affection for, and companion-
ship with, each other were concerned. Appellant objected 
on the grounds of incompetency, irrelevancy and imma-
teriality. ('Trans. 113; Ahst. 19-20.) 
The elements of affection and companionship, exist-
ing between John Potter and his deceased \Vife, were not 
proper subjects of inquiry. Certainly, it will not be con-
tended that such loss of affection and companionship as 
the surviving husband sustained, represented any pe-
cuniary loss. To put such matters before the jury, tend-
ed to bring into the case elements which the law does not 
recognize as compensable in an action for damages. 
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~r rs. Potter had her last ht•a rt attack ten days prior 
to her adn1ission into the hospital. At that time Dr. 
Bourne gave her a physical examination and thereafter 
continued to ob~erYP her condition. He expressed the 
opinion that :Jirs. Potter would never reroYer. For her 
condition the appellant was not responsible. There is no 
evidence in the record eYen to suggest the possibility that 
:Jirs. Potter would ever again be able to render any as-
sistance to her husband. 
This Court, in the case of Burbidge v. Utah Light & 
Traction Company, 57 Utah 566; 196 Pacific 556, had the 
following to say on the question of the necessity of show-
ing some pecuniary loss connected with or incident to the 
loss of companionship and association: 
"l~nder our statute the right to maintain an 
action for the wrongful death ·of an adult is in the 
heirs or the personal representative for the benefit 
of the heirs. It may be conceded, I think, as a 
fun dam en tal principle, that any recovery under 
like or si1nilar statutes to ours must be founded 
upon a pecuniary loss and the loss must be such 
that in contemplation of law it amounts to the de-
privation of some service, attention, or care that 
has in it the elements of pecuniary value. That 
principle was stated by this court in an early case. 
In Pool v. Southern Pac. Co., 7 Utah 310, 26 Pac. 
656, the Court said: 
'If the testimony did not show that there were 
hPir~ living who were pecuniarily injured by his 
death, no recovery should be had, as in that case 
no one has sustained any pecuniary loss or injury 
hy his death.' '' 
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ASSIGNMENTS NOS. VIII and IX 
The first of these assignments was directed to the 
question put to the witness, Jennie I. Potter, to state what 
had been the conduct and attitude of her mother toward 
her children ; the second, to the refusal of the Court to 
strike the answer of 1the same witness, wherein she 
stated, in substance, that her mother had been the 
grandest mother in the world and had always been grand 
to her children. Appellant's objection and motion to 
strike were made on the ground of incompetency, irrele-
vancy and imma:terialit)r. (Trans. 113-14; Abst. 20-21.) 
What was said under the preceding heading (Assign-
ments Nos. VI and VII) applies even with greater force to 
the instant matters. Not in years had 1\Irs. Potter been 
able to do anything for her children. It was they "·ho 
were called upon to help their mother. They rendered 
not only financial assistance, but helped her in and about 
the housework in the parental home at Price, Utah. vVhat 
pecuniary loss, then, did they sustain~ The record shows 
none; on the contrary, it discloses that with the death of 
their mother, they were relieved of making further contri-
butions for her support, and of rendering further assist-
ance in the home. A further discussion of this question 
will be found under the heading dealing with the Court's 
instruction No. 9. 
ASSIGN~1E~rrr NO. X 
This assignment makes complaint of the overruling 
by the trial court of appellant's (defendant's) objection 
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to the following question, propounded to the witness, 
Jennie I. Potter: 
Q. 'Yhat, if anything, did you do by way of 
special nurse after the injury to your mother~ 
The objeetion was grounded on immateriality to any issue 
involYed in the case. (Trans. 115; Abst. 21.) 
The fall sustained by ~Irs. Potter occurred in the 
early morning of February 21st; death resulted two days 
later. Following the accident, the daughters employed a 
special nurse to care for their mother, and for that serv-
ice paid the sum of $15.00. It will not be contended that 
appellant was in any way obligated to furnish a special 
nurse. ~Irs. Potter was a non-pay and charity patient. 
But even had she been a pay patient, still there would 
have been no obligation to provide her with any service 
except that rendered by the nurses regularly employed. 
To permit the witness to testify as to what was paid for 
special nurses, follo\ving the accident for which it was 
eharged appellant was responsible, injected something 
into the case that was not properly there. If appellant 
was held to be chargeable with the accident, then the jury 
might well conclude that the cost of special nurse service 
was a legitimate element of damage; and this would be 
so in spite of the fact that respondents made no such 
elairn for special damages in their complaint. The evi-
dence was not supported by any allegation of the com-
plaint. 
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AS8IGNlVfENT NO. XI 
Appellant waives this assignment. 
ASSIGNMENTS NOS. XII and XIII 
The first of these assignments is directed to the rul-
ing of 'the trial court, denying appellant's motion for a 
non-suit (Trans. 184-'6; Abst. 35-37); the second, to the 
ruling denying appellant's motion for a directed verdict. 
(Trans. 288-92; A'bs;t. 62-67.) 
The motion for a non-suit covers one ground not 
specifically included in the motion for a directed verdict. 
We refer to ground 3. We shall first discuss that ground, 
and then take up the motion for a directed verdict, which 
includes all other points raised in the earlier motion. 
MOTION FOR NON-SUIT (Assignment No. XII) 
Ground 3 of the motion reads : 
'' 3. That there is an utter lack of evidence 
to establish that the defendant in the exercise of 
the care and duty which it owed to the deceased, 
was required to maintain and keep in place side-
hoards on the hospital bed occupied by the de-
ceased.'' 
Respondents failed to offer one word of testimony as 
to what was considered good practice hy hospitals, in this 
or any other community, in the use of sideboards on beds 
occupied by their patients. They rested their case after 
calling one witness to show that no sideboard was used 
by appellant at the time l\[rs. Pottc'r attempted to get out 
of her bed and go to the hathroon1. 
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If the ease had been sub1nitterl on respondents' evi-
dence alone. the jurors would haYe been left to determine 
for themselves whether, under the circumstances of the 
case, a sideboard should haYe been used. If in their opin-
ion, looking ret rospecti L'ely at the incident, it was felt 
that a sideboard "\Vould haYe prevented the injury even 
though no such precaution, so far as they were aware, 
had ever before been considered advisable or proper in a 
case similar to that of ~Irs. Potter's, the jurors would 
have been permitted to find in favor of respondents. 
It was incumbent upon respondents to offer some evi-
dence as to the standard of care required by appellant. 
Failing so to do, it was error for the trial court to deny 
the motion for a non-suit. 
Appellant was no more an insurer of Mrs. Potter, 
than are employers the insurers of their employees. The 
liability of the latter is concisely stated in a note found 
in 88 An1erican State Reports 833: 
''They are liable for the consequences, not of 
danger, but of negligence. And the unbending test 
of negligence in method, machinery and appliances 
is the ordinary usage of the business. Moreover, 
no man is held to a higher degree of skill than the 
fair average of his profession or trade, and the 
standard of due care is the conduct of the average 
prudent man.'' (Citing a number of authorities.) 
In the case of Canadian Northern Railway Company 
v. Senske, 201 Fed. Rep. 637 ( 1912), we find an unusually 
full and complete discussion of the question of standard 
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of care to be applied in actions grounded upon negligence. 
The opinion was written by Mr. Justice Sanborn, Circuit 
Judge, and is frequently cited in negligence cases. While 
the plaintiff, an employee of the railroad company, was 
climbing upon a foreign freight car, a handhold on the 
roof pulled off, throwing plaintiff to the ground. In the 
action plaintiff sought to recover damages for the result-
ing injuries. On the question of the measure of care re-
quired, the Court said (p. 643): 
''The validity of the general abstract rule that 
the measure of care required of an employer is 
that degree of care which an ordinarily prudent 
man, engaged in the same kind of business, would 
have exercised under silnilar circumstances, is con-
ceded. In cases like Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. 
Behymer, 189 U. S. 468, 23 Sup. Ct. 622, 47 L. Ed. 
905,_ and Chicago, 1\iilwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. 
v. Moore, 166 Fed. 663, 92 C. C. A. 357, 23 L. R. A. 
(N. S.) 962, in which there is no proof of the (1c·-
gree of care which other ordinarily prudent per-
sons engaged in the smne kind of business com-
nwnly use, juries may measure the care required 
of a defendant by the application of this rule to 
other facts and circumstances in evidence before 
the·m. But the best evidence of the degree of care 
-vvhich ordinarily prudent persons would have ex-
ercised under given circumstances is the degree of 
care \vhich ordinarily prudent persons, engaged in 
the same kind of business customarily have exer-
cised and commonly do exercise under similar 
circumstances. And when the evidence of this de-
gree of care is substantial or undisputed it furn-
ishes the true and the best standard of ordinary 
care by which -that actually used should be mea~­
ured in all debatable caRe~. 
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in ca~es of this character is an exceedingly grave 
and important practical question to all employers 
and employes. It is Yery important that this stand-
ard should be as fixed, certain, and ·well known as 
possible, so that employers can know before the 
events ·w·hether or not they are exercising the 
requisite care and faithfully discharging their du-
ties. The degree of care commonly exercised by 
other persons engaged in the same kind of busi-
ness under sin1ilar circumstances presents such a 
standard. The opinions and verdicts of juries, no 
tzco of zcl1 ich wottld probably agree, fixing the 
standard by 1rhich to measure the employer's care 
after the events have happened, wou,ld necessarily 
be variant, ttncertain, and speculative, and would 
fu ruish no reasonably certain standard of rneas--
urem ent zchatet·er." (Italics ours.) 
Another case, inYolving the question of standard of 
care, is that of Louisville N. A. & C. Ry. Co. v. Bates 
(Ind.), 45 X. E. 109. The same general rule of law was 
announced by the Court in that case, namely, that one is 
held to no higher degree of skill or care than a fair av-
erage of one's trade or profession, and that the yardstick 
to be used in determining negligence is that degree of care 
which an ordinarily prudent man, engaged in the same 
kind of business, would have exercised under similar cir-
cumstance~. 
Certainly, to say the least, the instant case comes 
within the class of those in which the sufficiency of the 
degree of care exercised by the appellant was, in the ah-
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sence of evidence, debatable. If the care exercised by 
appellant was equal to or greater than the standard an-
nounced in the authorities from which we have hereto-
fore quoted, then appellant cannot be held to have been 
negligent. 
When and when not, we ask, should sideboards be 
used in the hospital room? No attempt whatever had 
been made to answer that question when the trial court 
was asked to pass upon the motion for a non-suit. 
MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT 
To facilitate its consideration, ·we quote the motion in 
its entirety: 
'' 1. That there is a total want of evidence to 
show that the deceased fell out of bed. 
"2. That the evidence shm~~s ·without dispute 
that the deceased herself got out of bed, and while 
in the act of so doing fell to the floor and sustained 
the injuries of which complaint is made. 
'' 3. That the evidence shows without dispute, 
and there being no evidence to the contrary, that 
there was no reasonable ground to believe, that 
there was no reasonable grounds for the defendant 
to believe-no, put it this way: there were no rea-
sonable grounds to believe, on the part of those 
charged with caring for deceased in defendant's 
hospital, that the condition of deceased required 
or suggested the advisability of the use of side-
boards. 
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''-L That the evidence shmY~ 'Without dis-
pute, there being no eYidenee to the contrary, that 
there were no reasonable grounds to believe, on the 
part of those charged 'With caring for the de-
ceased in defendant's hospital, that the condition 
of the deeeased required or suggested the advis-
ability of deceased being guarded by a nurse, or 
other\Yise, or at all. 
'' 5. That there is no evidence to shov{ that 
the accident sustained by deceased would have 
been prevented or \Yas likely to have been pre-
vented had sideboards been placed to the side of 
defendant's bed. 
"6. That the evidence shovvs without dis-
pute that the deceased herself got out of bed, that 
her act IYas voluntary, and that even though side-
boards had been in position or in place on the bed 
of the deceased, still the deceased was in a concli-
tion and able to get out of bed or to crawl over the 
siclc-boaTCls and get out of bed. 
"7. That the e''"vridence Ydwllv fails to shovv 
that the injuries sustained by dece~·sed were proxi-
mately caused by defendant':-·. failure to maintain 
sideboards on deceased's bed or by defendant's 
failure to do for decc::ased that which defendant 
\Yas required to do under the law. 
'' 8. That the evidence ·wholly fails to show 
that the death of deceased was proximately caused 
hy defendant's failure to maintain sideboards on 
deceased's bed or by defendant's failure to do 
for deceased that which defendant was required to 
do under the la\iT. 
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"9. That the evidence shows without dispute 
that defendant, in caring for the deceased, used 
that degree of care usually and customarily exer-
cised by hospitals in caring for the sick who are 
in the condition in which the evidence shows the 
deceased to have been. 
'' 10. That the evidence shows without dis-
pute that for a number of hours before the accident 
the deceased was free from restlessness and that 
five minutes before the accident she was still free 
from restlessness; also that she was a-wake fiye 
minutes before the accident and was talking and 
was rational. and that there was nothing about the 
condition of the deceased which required the de-
fendant, in the exercise of reasonable care, and in 
the exercise of that degree of care required of de-
fendant by the law, to provide sideboards for the 
bed of the deceased. 
"11. That the evidence at this stage conclu-
sively shows that the deceased entered the hospi-
tal on the night of February 16, 1939, in a very 
poor condition, and that her condition was such 
that in all probability she would not recover from 
the ailment with which she was suffering. 
'' 12. That the evidence affirmatively shows 
that the breaking of the femur, fracture of the fe-
mur of the deceased was not a contributing cause 
to the death of deceased. The evidence shows 
the deceased was in such condition that she would 
have died by reason of the ailment from which 
she was suffering at the time of her admittance 
into the hospital on February 16, 1939. 
"13. ·That the evidence shows without dis-
pute that the deceased, in her relationship to the 
defendant hospital, was a non-paying patient, that 
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she was a charitY case; also that the hospital "Tas 
a charitable in~titution, and that the evidence 
wholly fails to show that the hospital, the defend-
ant, \Yas negligent or did not use reasonable care 
in the selection of its employees and servants who 
attended the deceased. 
'' 14. That the evidence shows the deceased 
"\vas a non-paying patient, a charity patient, and 
that the hospital, the defendant, was a charitable 
institution and that the hospital under the cir-
cumstances was exempt from liability for the neg-
ligent acts of its e1nployees, agents and servants, 
who were called upon to care for and who did care 
for the deceased during her illness. 
'' 15. That the evidence shows without dispute 
that irrespective of the defendant's negligence in 
caring for deceased, if any negligence has been 
sho·wn, the defendant, by reason of its status as a 
charitable institution and by reason of the rela-
tions of the deceased to the defendant hospital, 
that of a non-paying and charitable patient, the de-
fendant would be exempt from liability for any of 
the negligent acts of its servants and employees of 
·which complaint is made by the plaintiffs in this 
case." 
GROUXDS 1 AND 2-:MOTION FOR 
DIRECTED VERDICT 
Under these grounds it is contended that there 
is no evidence that the deceased fell out of bed; also, that 
the evidence shows without dispute that the deceased 
herself got out of bed for the purpose of going to the 
bathroom, and, while so doing, fell to the floor. 
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There can be no question as to the state of the rec-
ord on these two matters. In considering them one should 
keep in mind the allegations of negligence found in the 
complaint. Appellant is charged (Paragraphs 6 and 7) 
with carelessly and negligently allowing Mrs. Potter to 
fall from her bed. This was brought about, the com-
plaint further alleges, by reason of appellant's failure 
'to provide sideboards and to guard the bed. 
The nurse, Leona Felix, \Yas the only \Yitness called 
in the case who saw just what happened. :Jirs. Kearney 
and JYirs. Potter were in room No. 437. After attending 
Mrs. Kearney, the nurse -went into room ~ o. 436, and 
immediately thereafter heard a conversation between 
the two patien:ts. She went back to their room and, by the 
use of a flashlight, saw Mrs. Potter sitting on the side 
of the bed, \\'ith her feet dangling over the edge. To 
quote from her testimony (Trans. 261; Abst. 56.): 
Q. And she \Yas sitting on the bed~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. On the edge of the bed? 
A. Yes, with her hands down, it looked to me like 
she was getting ready to get off in that position. 
Q. And was she in an upright sitting posture? 
A. Yes, she was. 
Q. In other words, she had left the back rest then f 
A. She had left ;the back rest, yes. 
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Q. Now, the portion of the bed where she was sit-
ting, what was that with respect to being horizontal, 
I mean level J? 
A. It was level, the lower part of the bed. 
Q. The lower part was level~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And with respect to 1that lower part, where was 
she sitting~ 
A. Well, I would say she would be sitting about one-
third of the way down on the bed. 
Q. And on the level part~ 
A. Yes; \Yell, in taking the bed as a whole it would 
be one-third of the bed and dividing it in thirds. 
Q. Dividing it into three, she would be sitting com-
mencing ·with the lower third~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. In other ·words, just below the break in the bed~ 
A. Yes. 
* * * 
Q. Now, at that time -vvhat did :Mrs. Potter do 1 
A. \Vell, ~irs. Potter-it happened so rapidly-
she must have, at the time I was trying to get to her, got 
off from the bed but I broke the upper half of her fall. 
Q. You broke it, you say~ 
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A. Yes, before her shoulders reached the floor I 
was there holding her. 
Q. At the instant she fell did Mrs. Kearney say 
anything? 
A. Yes, she did. 
Q. What did she say? 
A. She said, "I told her not to go to the bathroom. 
She said she was going to the bathroom." She said, "I 
told her not to go.'' 
From this testimony, it is obvious that ~frs. Potter 
herself got partly out of her bed, as she was sitting on 
the side when first seen by the nurse. Nowhere is there 
anything in the record to justify the allegation of the 
complaint that ~frs. Potter \vas allowed to fall out of the 
bed provided for her. By her own act she put herself in 
a sitting posture on the edge of the bed, and then, while 
attempting to get out and go to the bathroom, fell to the 
floor. 
There was a substantial ,~ariance and departure be-
tween allegations of the complaint and what actually oc-
curred immediately preceding the injury. 
GRIOUNDS 3 AND 4-~10TION FOR 
DIRECTED VERDICT 
The matter coming under this heading all relates to 
the use of sideboards on the bed-·whether there were rea-
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sonable grounds to believe that sideboards were ad-
Yisable. 
Respondents offered no testimony whatever as to 
when the use of sideboards in hospital cases were con-
sidered advisable. They rested their case with the tes-
timony that appellant failed to use sideboards, and then 
concluded that by reason thereof Mrs. Potter fell out of 
bed and sustained her injuries. Not a question was put 
to the single ·witness called by respondents which would 
tend to elicit information as to whether, in the case of 
:\Irs. Potter, sideboards \Yould be regarded as proper 
treatment. On the other hand, several of the witnesses 
called by appellant testified as to long experience in hos-
pitals, both in the State of Utah and elsewhere, and gave 
it as their opinion that sideboards were not only not nec-
essary in J!rs. Potter's case, but would have even tended 
to aggrayate the situation. 
X eoma Jf ason (Trans. 189; Abst. 37) graduated as a 
nurse in 1923 and since that time has followed that pro-
fession. On the question of sideboards, her testimony is 
reflectNl in the abstract, page 39, as follows: 
"The sideboards are fastened to the bed by 
means of a rope. The board protrudes above the 
mattress, I would say a foot. I have seen cases 
where sideboards were used and where the patient 
had gone over the top and out of bed. This hap-
pens quite frequently. We use sideboards in cases 
where the patients are unconscious and where they 
might become restless. Where a patient is not 
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restless and where the patient is awake and not 
unconscious, we ordinarily do not use sideboards. 
Sideboards are not used in all hospital cases for 
the reason that to do so would make the patient 
very uncomfortable. They would object to that 
sort of therapy. We haYe had patients object very 
much to the use of side boards. A great many of 
them feel as they do in oxygen tents, that they 
are crowded ; some complain like they would 
in a dark closet and they want to ge:t out, 
and it makes them more restless. It is our duty 
to try and relieve patients from restlessness and 
to do so promotes the healing process. 
* * * "I also sa-v\T her (~Irs. Potter) on Mon-
day morning and was required to be in her room 
on that day frequently in order to help with Mrs. 
l{earney, who was a very sick patient, suffering 
from rheumatism of the joints. I obserYecl Mrs. 
Potter particularly on l\1:onday because she seemed 
more restful and to enjoy the association with 
:Mrs. K~earney. l\1:rs. Potter was conscious. I left 
the hospital on l\fonday around four or five o 'elock. 
In the afternoon of that day, I made my rounds 
and observed that Mrs. Potter \Yas resting. When 
I saw Mrs. Potter she was sitting up in bed at a 
forty-five degree angle.'' 
Rhoda Larsen (Trans. 223; Abst. 47), another grad-
uate nurse, also testified, among other things, as to the 
use of sideboards. I-Ier testimony is reflected in the ab-
stract at page 49: 
"We have a great many patients who resent 
sideboards. They give them a shut-in feeling and 
they become more restle~s than without the boards. 
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It is onr purpose to rPlieYe patients or to reduce 
the degree of restlessnPss. I obspn·ed ~Irs. Pot-
ter on the afternoon of February 20. At that time 
I could see no reason for the use of sideboards. 
I left the hospital a:bout midnight and at no time 
prior to my departure did I feel that there wa~ 
any occasion for the use of sideboards. 'V e had 
been much concerned about ~r rs. Potter's condi-
tion and I always looked in at her. On tha't occa-
sion (:Jionday night) she and the other patient 
(:Jfrs. l{earney) seemed to be resting very quietly. 
* * * '"For a patient (Ahst. 51) in the con-
dition :Jirs. Potter "·as in :Monday night, I would 
say there was no need of sideboards. It is my ex-
perience that if the patient is determined to get 
out of the hospital bed, sideboards constitute no 
obstruction. ~lr~. Potter appeared to be en1tirely 
rational.'' 
In the light of thi~ record and testimony, although 
the burden was not upon appellant so to prove, neverthe-
less, it proved the opposite of that which respondents 
were required to prove, namely, that appellant allowed 
:Jf rs. Potter to fall from her bed, and failed to provide 
for and place sideboards on her bed when, in the exer-
eise of due care and treatment, sideboards were neces-
~ary. Respondents wholly failed to show either proposi-
tion: (1) That through any neglect of appellant, or at 
all, ~r rs. Potter fell out of bed; or (:2) that appellant, in 
1the exercise of the care required by law, should have used 
sideboards. 
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GROUNDS 5, 6, 7, AND 8-MOTION FOR 
DIRECTED VERDICT 
These grounds go to the question of proximate cause 
-that there was no evidence to show that the accident 
would have been prevented had sideboards been placed 
on Mrs. Potter's bed; that even though sideboards had 
been in position, still the deceased was in a condHion and 
able to get out of bed or to cra\vl over the sideboards; 
that the injuries sustained by !irs. Potter were not caused 
by appellant's failure to maintain sideboards or by ap-
pellant's failure to do anything required of it under the 
law. 
\Ve assert that there is nothing in the entire record 
to establish proximate cause. On the contrary, every-
thing therein points to an absence of any causal connec-
tion between that which the evidence established appel-
lant failed to do and the injuries received by 1Irs. Potter. 
The testimony heretofore quoted, amply bears out this 
contention. 
GROUNDS 9 AND 10-~IOTION FOR 
DIRECTED VERDICT 
These go to the care accorded ~r rs. Potter and the 
absence of anything about 11:rs. Potter's condition to sug-
gest the advisability of using sideboards. The testimony 
of Leona Felix (Trans. 246; Abst. 54), the only ·witness 
who saw what actually happened when 11:rs. Potter fell 
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and ::'nstained a broken hip, rlPa rly e~tahlishes that ap-
pellant did eYerything reasonably required of it in the 
care and 1treatment of ~Irs. Potter. She was placed in a 
ward ,yjth one other patient. As to that, no complaint is 
made. On the early morning of February 21st, :Miss Felix 
remained "·ith the patient for some little time. Mrs. 
Potter was then resting quietly. There was nothing about 
her condition to show irrationality or that she -was likely 
to make any attempt to get out of bed. In fact, this had 
been the situation for a considerable time. The other wit-
nesses, on duty during the preceding evening and after-
noon, gaYe the same testimony as to the patient's condi-
tion. J.fiss Felix had left the room in which Mrs. Potter 
and ~Irs. l(earney were located, for but a moment or two, 
whe:~. she heard them talking in a loud voice. 8he imme-
(liately returned to the room and found Thfrs. Potter sit-
ting on the edge of the bed. What happened thereafter 
was beyond the power of J.Iiss Felix to prevent. We do 
not belieYe that in this record of events there can be 
found any neglect chargeable to appellant. Appellant 
was not a guarantor that no injury would befall any of 
its patients. All it was required to do was use reasonable 
care in their treatment. 
What ~Iiss Felix testified to, as to the occurrences 
on the early morning of Fehruary 21, is fully borne out 
by the Clinical Record heretofore referred to in this 
brief. 
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GROUNDS 11 AND 12-MOTION FOR 
DIRECTED VERDICT 
These grounds have to do with the physical condi-
tion of Mrs. Potter when she entered the hospital and 
the contention that the ·breaking of her hip was not a con-
tributing cause to her death. Dr. John Bourne, the only 
medical expert who testified in the case, made an exam-
ination of Mrs. Potter at the time of her admittance and 
also observed her condition from day to day thereafter. 
It was his opinion that the condition of ~f rs. Potter was 
so serious that he doubted very much that she would ever 
recover. (Trans. 280; Abst. 60.) There was no evidence 
to the con1trary. 
GROUNDS 13, 14 AXD 15-::\IOTION FOR 
DIRECTED VERDICT 
Under these grounds, the trial court was required to 
pass upon the question of the liahili ty of the appellant to 
a non-paying or charity patient. 
From appellant's affirmative defense, and respond-
ents' s1tipulated admissions of the allegations therein con-
tained, it will appear that appellant is a non-profit and 
non-stock corporation, owned wholly by the Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints as an institution and 
not through any stock ownership; that it is engaged in 
operating a hospital, maintained, in part, by contribu-
tions and donations made by said Church and by the local 
ecclesiastical wards thereof, and that all of said contri-
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made by the individual members of said Church, which 
church acts as a conduit in the distribution thereof. 
(Trans. 20 and 15; Abst. 9 and 13.) It ·will also appear 
that on February 16, 1939, ~Irs. Potter was a member 
of the First \Yard of Price, one of the said ecclesiastical 
wards, and that on said day entered the hospi:tal; that 
upon her entrance no charge was made or entered by 
appellant against her or against any member of her fam-
ily; that no amount has ever been paid to the hospital for 
the care and maintenance of :Mrs. Potter and tha:t no 
amount has been paid by the Price First Ward which has 
been earmarked or designated to go to the hospital for 
said purpose. (Trans. 21-23 and 84-88; Abst. 11-12 and 
13-14.) 
The record will support the contention that Mrs. 
Potter was a non-paying or charity patient. Neither she 
nor any member of her family paid, or agreed to pay, 
any amount toward her hospitalization. During the time 
she was in the hospital, or sometime thereafter, the Price 
First \Vard made a contribution to the hospital in the 
amount of $10.00, but, under respondents' stipulation as 
to the allegations of sub-paragraph (d) of paragraph 9 
of appellant's affirmative answer, it was admitted that 
no amount was ever paid to the hospital for Mrs. Potter's 
care and maintenance, and that no amount received from 
the Price First vVard was earmarked or designated for 
~aid purpose. 
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In the case of Sessions vs. Thomas Dee :Jiemorial 
Hospital Association, 89 Ut. 222, 51 P. (2nd) 229; also, on 
second appeal, 94 Ut. 460, 78 P. (2nd) 645, this Court 
held, in a three to two decision, that a hospital, in the 
case of a paying patient, was liable for the death of the 
patien1t resulting from the negligent act of one of the 
hospital nurses. This was a departure from the general 
rule of non-liability preYailing in this country and from 
what had theretofore been recognized as the law of this 
state. In an elaborate dissenting opinion hy the then 
Chief Justice, :Mr. Justice Folland, with Associate Justice 
Hanson, concurring, decisions from practically three-
fourths of the states were cited in support of the rule that 
charitable hospitals, even as to paying patients, vvere im-
mune from liability. The majority opinion, it will be ob-
served, relied largely on the Idaho case of Henderson vs. 
Twin Falls County, 56 Idaho 124, 50 Pac. (2d) 597, 101 A. 
L. R. 1151, and at this time it is interesting to note that 
within two months after the decision in the Henderson 
case, the Idaho Court, finding a distinction between that 
case and the case then before jt (vVilcox vs. Idaho Falls 
Latter-day Saint I-Iospital, 82 P. (2nd) 849), arrived at 
an exactly opposition conclusion from the Utah court and 
extended the rule of immunity" to a paying patientt. 
In the instant case respondents did not allege that 
appellant had not used reasonable care in the selection 
of i,ts nurses; no attempt was made, either in the plead-
ings or by the testimony, to ground their ease upon that 
theory. By reason of this fart, we submit that the great 
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weight of authority followed by the courts of this coun-
try sustain the doctrine of in1munity to a charitable in-
stitution rendering serTice to a non-paying patient. We 
cite the following authorities, upholding this rule of la-w: 
Arizona: Southern :Methodist Hospital v. Wilson, 
45 Ariz. 507, 46 Pac. (2d) 118. 
California: Hallinan v. Prindle, 17 Cal. App. (2d) 
656, 62 Pac. (2d) 1075; Lewis v. Y. M. C. A., 206 Cal. 115, 
:213 P. 580. (Liability sustained because of absence of 
showing of reasonable care in selecting employees.) 
Colorado: Brm\-rn v. St. Luke's Hospital Association, 
85 Colo. 167, 274 Pac. 740. 
Connecticut: Boardman v. Burlingame, 197 Atl. 
/(il; Cashman v. :Jieriden Hospital, 117 Conn. 585, 169 
Atl. 915; Cohen v. General Hospital Society, 113 Conn. 
118, 134 Atl. 433 (liable to invitee). 
Georgia: Jackson v. Atlanta Good vVill Indus1tries, 
46 Ga. App. 4:2:-l, 167 S. E. 702 (liability denied stranger 
injured by a truck operated by servant of charity); Plant 
System Relief & I-Iospital Department v. Dickerson, 118 
Ga. 647, 45 S. E. 483; Georgia Baptist Hospital v. Smith, 
37 Ga. App. 92, 139 S. E. 101; :Mitchell v. Executive Com-
mittee, 49 Ga. App. 615, 176 S. E. 669; Robertson v. Ex-
ecutive Committee of Baptist Convention, 190 S. E. 432. 
The rule of immunity applies to stranger and beneficiary 
alike, qualified always hy exercise of due care in selection 
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of employees, but repudiates rule of exemption to extent 
recovery may be had from income ''derived from patients 
who paid for services.'' Morton v. Savannah Hospital, 
148 Ga. 438, 96 S. E. 887, 14 A. L. R. 603. 
Indiana: St. Vincent's Hospital v. Stine, 195 Ind. 
350, 144 N. E. 537, 33 A. L. R. 1361 (patient denied recov-
ery) ; Old Folks' & Orphans Children's I-Iome Y. Roberts, 
91 Ind. App. 533, 171 N. E. 10 (recovery allowed account 
incompetence manager known to trustees). 
Idaho: Wilcox v. Idaho Falls Latter-day Saints 
Hospital, 82 Pac. (2d) 849 (immunity regardless of pres-
ence or absence of care in selection), overruling Hender-
son v. Twin Falls County, 56 Idaho 124, 50 Pac. (2d) 597, 
101 A. L. R. 1151. 
Imva: Eighmy v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 93 Ia. 538, 
61 N W. 1056; and Andrews v. Y. 1\L C. A., 284 N. \Y. 186 
(limiting the rule to beneficiaries and sustaining judg-
ment for plaintiff, an employee). 
Louisiana: Foye v. St. Francis' Sanatorium & Training 
School for Nurses, 2 La. App. 305; and Unser v. Baptist 
Rescue 1\iission, 157 So. 298 (liability sustained as to third 
party); Bougon v. Volunteers of America, 151 So. 797. 
l\Iichigan: Greatrex v. Evangelical Deaconess Hos-
pital, 261 Mich. 327, 246 N. \V. 137, 86 A. L. R. 487; and 
Bruce v. Central l\L E. Chun·h, 147 1\iich. 230, 110 N. \V. 
951, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 74. 
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:Jfissi.ssippi: Eastman Gardinrr Con1pany Y. Per-
menter. 111 ~Iiss. 813. 7~ So. 23± ~ James Y. Y. & ~r. V. R. 
R. Co .. 153 ~liss. 776. 121 So. 819 ~ Pace v. :l\Iethodist 
Hospital, 130 So. 468: and ~Iississippi Baptist Hospital 
'T· :Jioore, 156 ~Iiss. 676, 126 So. 465, 67 A. L. R. 1106; 
Rhodes Y. :Jiillsaps College, 179 :Miss. 596, 176 So. 253 
(liability sustained \Yhere injury to stranger from opera-
tion of office building elevator, disconnected with direct 
work of charity-a college). 
:1Iontana: Borgeas Y. Oregon Short Line R. R. Co., 
73 :\Iont. 407, 236 Pac. 1069; Simons v. Northern Pacific 
R.aihn1~- et al., 94 :Jiont. 355, 22 Pac. (2d) 609 (Question 
presented but case decided on other issues). 
X ebraska: Duncan Y. X ebraska Sanitarium Benev. 
_A"sociation, 92 X eb. 162, 137 N. ,Y. 1120; Marble v. 
Xieholas Senn Hospital Association, 102 Neb. 343, 167 
:·\. """'"· 208; Sibilia Y. Paxton Hospital, 121 Neb. 860, 238 
~- vV. 151; and 'Vrighf Y. Salvation Army, 125 Neb. 216, 
249 N. \V. 549 (sustaining liability for injury to invitee). 
X evada: Bruce v. Y. ~r. C. A., 51 Nev. 372, 277 Pac. 
798. 
N e\\T J rrsey: Boeckel Y. Orange ~Iemorial Hospital, 
158 Atl. 832; and Simmons v. "'Tiley ~I. E. Church, 112 
N. J. Law 129, 170 Atl. 237 (sustaining liability as to 
~ tr·anger). 
North Carolina: Cowans v. N. C. Baptist Hospital, 
197 N. C. 41, 147 S. E. 672. 
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Ohio: Walsh v. Sisters of Charity, 47 Ohio App. 
228, 191 N. E. 791; Sisters of Charity of Cincinnati v. · 
Duvelius, 123 Ohio Rt. 52, 173 N. E. 737; holding rule of 
immunity applicable only to beneficiaries; and Waddell 
v. Y. W. C. A., 133 Ohio St. 601, 15 N. E. (2d) 140; Rudy 
v. Lakeside I-Iospital, 115 Ohio St. 539, 155 N. E. 126; 
Taylor v. Flower Deaconess 1-Iome & Hospital, 104 Ohio 
St. 61, 135 N. E. 287, 23 A. L. R. 900. 
Texas: Steele v. St. Joseph Hospital, 60S. \V. (2d) 
1083; and Baylor University v. Boyd, 18 S. \\",.. (2d) 700. 
Virginia: Norfolk Protestant Hospital v. Plunkett, 
162 V a. 151, 173 S. E. 363 ; Bodenheimer v. Confederate 
Memorial Association, 292 U. S. 629, 78 L. Ed. 1483; 
Hospital of St. Vincent v. Thompson, 116 Va. 101, 81 
S. E.13. 
Washington: Susman Y. Y. l\f. C. A., 101 \Vash. 487, 
172 Pac. 554; Thurston Chapter v. Department of Labor, 
166 Wash. 488, 7 Pac. ( 2d) 577; Tribble v. l\1issionary 
Sisters, etc., 137 \Vash. 326, 242 Pac. 372; Bise v. St. 
Luke's Hospital, 181 \\~ash. 269, 43 Pac. (2d) 4; l\filler 
v. Mohr, 98 \Vash. Dec. 543, 89 Pac. (2d) 807 (1939). 
West Virginia: Roberts v. Ohio Valley Hospital, 98 
W. Va. 476, 127 S. E. 318, 42 A. L. R. 968. 
vVyoming: Bishop Randall I-Iospital v. I-Iartley, 24 
\Vyo. 408, 160 Pac. 385. 
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.ASSIGX~fEXTS XOS. XIV TO XVI. I~CLUSIVE 
These assign1nents relate to the court's Instruction 
X o. :2, and are waiYed by appellant. 
ASSIGX~IEXTS XOS. XVII TO XIX, INCLUSIVE 
The foregoing assignments are directed to Instruc-
tion X o. 9, as given by the trial court. The instruction 
reads: 
''The court instructs the jury that if you be-
lieve from a preponderance of the evidence that 
the plaintiffs are entitled to recover, in estimating 
the damage the jury have the right to consider the 
amotmt, if any, incurred by the plaintiffs, or any 
of them, for funeral and burial expenses by reason 
of the death of the deceased; also the pecuniary 
value, if any, of the loss of the society and com-
panionship of the deceased to the plaintiffs or any 
of them and the pecuniary value, if any, to the 
husband of the loss of the services of the deceased 
to him; and \Yhen considering all of the evidence 
and the instructions given you by the court, you 
should render such a verdict as under all 'the cir-
cumstances of the case you find to be just.'' 
Appellant excepted to the instruction as a whole; 
also, separately, to 'the following parts: 
(a) "also the pecuniary value, if any, of the 
los~ of the society and companionship of the de-
eeased to the plaintiffs or any of them,'' 
(b) "and the pecuniary value, if any, to the 
husband of the loss of services of the deceased 
to him;'' 
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Both (a) and (b), -vve submit, have no application to 
the facts of the case and were improperly given. 
There is not a scintilla of evidence in the entire rec-
ord to establish that the loss of the society and compan-
ionship was founded, in the least, upon any pecuniary 
loss. As ,;ve have heretofore pointed out, under Assign-
ments Nos. VIII and IX, the death of Mrs. Potter re-
lieved respondents of making contributions for her sup-
port and maintenance and of rendering assistance to her 
in the household wo1·k in and about her home. Our law 
is such that any recovery to which respondents are en-
titled must be founded upon a pecuniary loss; in other 
words, respondents must show that they have been de-
prived of something that has in it the element of pecuni-
ary value. vVe again state that the record is clear in 
establishing that l\Jrs. Potter had not been able to do 
anything for her children for a number of years, and that 
even prior to the injury -vvhich she sustained in the hos-
pital, her condition was such as to cause Dr. Bourne to 
testify that in his opinion she would never recover. And 
in 1this connection we should keep in mind that Dr. Bourne 
was the only medical expert to offer any testimony bear-
ing upon the physical condition of deceased. The· pa-
tient's chart (Exhibit A) lends support to his opinion. 
Furthermore, all of the other witnesses, including the 
sole witness called by respondents, Jennie I. Potter, gave 
testimony as to the grave condition of l\f rs. Potter. Her 
last heart attack antedated her admittance into the hos-
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pital by ten days. and, following that attack, she was 
at all times bedridden. 
This Court passed upon a similar question in the 
ease of \Yhite Ys. Shipley, 48 Ut. 496, 160 P. 441. The 
action \Yas brought to recover damages for alleged neg-
ligence causing the death of plaintiff's intestate. The 
facts are so strikingly similar that we feel justified in 
quoting at some length from the Court's opinion, begin-
ning on page 499 of the Utah report : 
''The only beneficiary alleged in 1the com-
plaint is the administratrix, the widow of the de-
eeased. The defendants, however, on cross-exam-
ination of the widow, showed that the deceased left 
children, but that they were all adults and mar-
ried, and for a long time prior to the death of the 
deceased had lived separate and apart from him, 
who~ at the time of his death, was seventy-two 
years of age. Among other things the court, on 
damages, charged: 
'In determining the amount to be awarded 
to the plaintiff, in case you find a verdict in 
her f~vor, you n1ay also take into considera-
tion the loss of comfort, society, and compan-
ionship of said deceased, if any, which the 
plaintiff, his widow and his children have sus-
tained 1)y reason of his death.' 
"Complaint is made of this. It is conceded 
that as an abstract proposition the charge is not 
a misstatement of the law. 
"It, however, is contended that it is here er-
roneous because it was not alleged in the complaint 
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that :the deceased left any children, and, further, 
because not applicable to the evidence. It was in-
disputably shown that the children, two sons, one 
forty, the other forty-six, years of age, and five 
daughters, the youngest thirty-one, and the eldest 
forty-eight years of age, were all married and had 
lived separate and apart from the deceased, some 
in Los Angeles, Cal., some in Salt Lake City, and 
some in Ogden City where the deceased resided. 
In an action brought by an administrator to re-
cover damages for the ·wrongful death of another 
it is essential to aver that there are beneficiaries 
or persons entitled under the statute to the bene-
fit of the recovery. Such a person (the widow) 
w·as alleged. Since, ·without objection and by the 
defendants themselves, it was shown that the de-
ceased also left children, it is not necessary now 
to decide where some such beneficiaries are al-
leged whether others not alleged may, without an 
amend1nen t to the complaint, also be shown and 
their loss considered and damages a warded for it. 
So, in determining the damages \vhich the admin-
istratrix in her representative capacity was en-
titled to recover, \Ve, under the circumstances, 
shall assume that she was entitled to recover for 
all of the beneficiaries shown by the evidence to 
have sustained pecuniary loss. But in so consider-
ing the matter V{e are of the opinion error was 
committed in directing the jury, as was done, that 
in determining the loss or damage which the chil-
dren sustained the jury could consider the loss of 
comfort, society, and companionship. There is 
no doubt that under the holdings of this court such 
a charge is proper in a case where there is evi-
dence to show such loss. But here there is no evi-
dence, so far as the children are concerned, to 
show it. As alread~, shown, the children \Vere all 
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married and maintaining separate homes, and for 
a long time had lived separate and apart from the 
deceased. The law awards damages for loss of 
comfort, society, and companionship only in a 
pecuniary sense and not as a solatium. Under the 
circun1stances such pecuniary loss sustained by the 
children at most ·was but nominal. Indeed, except 
mere nominal, it is not made to appear that the 
children sustained any pecuniary loss whatsoever. 
They received none of the deceased's earnings, nor 
did he otherwise maintain them or in any way con-
tribute towards their support. Nor is there any-
thing made to appear that, had he lived his ex-
pectancy, they would haYe received any enhanced 
inheritance. As to them the court ought to have 
directed the jury that nothing but nominal dam-
ages could be awarded. The charge permitted the 
jury to award them actual damages. That was 
\\Tong. St. Louis & San Francisco Ry. Co. v. 
Tmvnsencl, 69 Ark. 380, 63 S. \Y. 994; North Chi-
cago Street Ry. Co. v. Irwin, 202 Ill. 345, 66 N. E. 
101/; Portsmouth Street Ry. Co. Y. Peed ''s Admin-
istrator, 102 y· a. 662, 47 S. E. 850; In re California 
~av. & Imp. Co. (D. C.), 110 Fed. 670. This is 
but applying the familiar rule that an element of 
damage upon which there is no evidence to support 
it should not be submitted to the jury Candland 
v. ~I ellen, 46 Utah 519, 151 Pac. 341." 
In the instant ea~e, while the allegations of the com-
plaint \vrre sufficient to justify Instruction No. 9, there 
\\'as nothing in the evidence to support those allegations . 
.. \nd it is elementary that instructions must 1w based upon, 
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not only :the pleadings, but also the evidence. Davis vs. 
Midvale City, 56 Ut. 1, 189 P. 74; Littledyke vs. Wood, 69 
Ut. 323, 255 P. 172. 
Whether anything was allowed by the jury for loss of 
society and companionship, obviously cannot be deter-
mined. But whether one dollar or the full amount of the 
verdict, there was no evidence to support any award for 
~hat element of damage. The charge was error and was 
calculated to do harm, and in such case prejudice will be 
presumed until by the record it is shown that the error 
could not have been harmful. Boston and Albany Ore 
Company vs. 0 'Reilley, 158 U. S. 334, 15 S. C. I. 830, 39 
L. Ed. 1006; State vs. Cluff, 48 Ut. 102, 158 P. 701. 
ASSIGNMENT NO. XX. 
This assignment went to the Court's refusal to in-
struct the jury in accordance ·with appellant's request 
No. 6, reading as follows: 
''If you find from a preponderance of the evi-
dence, as that term is elsewhere defined in these 
instructions, that on February 21, 1939, the de-
ceased, while a patient in defendant's hospital 
fell out of bed, receiving a fracture to the femur, 
which fracture is admitted in this case, but that in 
the care and treatment which defendant rendered 
to said deceased, defendant \nls not guilty of any 
carelessness or negligence, then your verdict 
should ·be against plaintiffs and in favor of defend-
ant, no cause of art ion.'' 
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The casf:\ covered onf:\ contention made hy appellant 
throughout the trial of the rasP, namely, that irrespec-
tiYe of the fall which ~1 rs. Potter sustained there was no 
evidence to establish that appellant was guilty of an~" 
carelessness or negligence. It constituted at least a part 
of appellant's theory of the case, and in no other instruc-
tion "·as the matter adequately covered. The appellant, 
we submit. was entitled to have its theory submitted to the 
jury. :Morgan YS. Bingham Stage Lines Company, 75 
rt. 87, 283 P. 160. 
~-\~SIGX:JIEXT XO. XXI. 
Appellant elai1ns nothing for this Assignment. 
ASSIGX:JfE~T NO. XXII. 
Under this assignment it is claimed that the Court 
erred in refusing to giYe appellant's request No. 14, read-
ing as follows : 
''You are instructed that there is no evi-
dence in this case that the deceased fell out of bed 
while a patient in defendant's hospital." 
As we have heretofore argued, respondents grounded 
their case upon the proposition that appellant allowed 
1llrs. Potter to fall out of bed. There is no evidence in 
the case to support that proposition. Again, we repeat, 
the nur:-;e, ~liss Felix, was the only one to testify as to 
what actually happened. Mrs. Potter, according to her 
tP~timony, did not fall out of bed. When the nurse re-
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turned to the room, Mrs. Potter was sitting on the edg-e 
of the bed. The fall occurred when ~Irs. Potter herself 
at:tempted to get from the bed to the floor. This in no 
sense can be regarded the sarne as "falling out of bed." 
The latter carries with it the implication of the absence 
of any voluntary and intentional act upon the part of the 
patient. Such, we earnestly urge, the record does not 
support. She even went so far as to tell :Mrs. Kearney 
that she was going to the bath room. It being conclu-
sively established that there was "no evidence in this 
case that the deceased fell out ·of bed,'' it was error for 
the trial court to refuse to charge the jury in accordance 
with defendant's request No. 14. 
For the reasons herein set forth, we earnestly urge 
that appellant is entitled 'to a new trial. 
Respectfully subn1itted, 
M. C. FAUX and 
IRVINE, SI(EEN, THURMAN & 
MINER, 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
Dated February 5, 1940. 
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